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I
Imagine you are looking at a uniformly colored object whose parts are differently illuminated. 
Perhaps it is someone’s orange shirt: he is sitting by the window, so that the upper half is 
brilliantly lit by direct sunshine, whereas the lower half is not. It does not look as if he is wearing 
a bicolor shirt: on the contrary, it looks orange all over, the same orange top and bottom. On the 
other hand, the top and bottom look different: the top half looks significantly lighter than the 
bottom. On the face of it, we have an inconsistency in the appearances: the shirt looks uniformly 
orange, and yet the parts look different in color. It may be that appearances are occasionally, and 
under extraordinary circumstances, inconsistent: one might cite the waterfall illusion or the 
appearance of one of Escher’s paradoxical drawings. But the present example is of the most 
ordinary possible kind. We hardly ever, in normal circumstances, see things which are 
completely evenly illuminated. It seems mad to suppose that there is hardly ever, in normal 
circumstances, consistency in visual appearances. This paper shows how madness can be 
avoided.
The relevant phenomenon is related to the fairly well understood phenomenon of “lightness 
constancy”. Normally, as in the case of the orange shirt, the mechanism works well, ensuring that 
appearances are not deceived by different levels of illumination. But it can be fooled, as this 
example by Edward Adelson shows:
2©1995, Edward H. Adelson http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html
The very mechanism which makes the orange shirt look uniform makes squares A and B look 
disparate, though they are the same shade of grey (check the image on the right). In this case, the 
visual system provides no correction, and we have an illusion: in no sense and in no way do 
these squares look the same grey in the figure on the left. By contrast, in the case of the orange 
shirt, vision appears to deliver two verdicts, both in some sense correct: that the shirt is uniform 
orange, and that the two regions differ in color.
The experience of the orange shirt is one we intuitively wish to count as veridical. There is no 
illusion, not the slightest tendency to form a false belief, and no sense of a divergence between 
appearance and reality. Yet on natural accounts of veridicality, we can shift the inconsistency 
from within the appearance into reality itself.
V1: If an object, x, looks F, this experience is veridical iff x is F.
V2: If objects x and y look different in color, this experience is veridical iff x and y are 
different in color.
These principles about veridicality, given our assumptions about looks stated by (1) and (2) 
below, transport the inconsistency from within appearance into the world of fact:
1. The shirt looks uniformly orange.
2. The upper and lower parts of the shirt look different in color.
33. The experiences which make (1) and (2) true are veridical.
4. The shirt is uniformly orange. (1, 3, V1)
5. The upper and lower parts of the shirt are different in color. (2, 3, V2)
The inconsistency between (4) and (5), a consequence of seemingly platitudinous premises, is 
the puzzle about how things look which this paper addresses.
It is not difficult to come up with a redescription of the situation which has no obvious gaps yet 
which contains no inconsistency. The shirt looks to be uniform in color, though the plainly 
visible different levels of illumination ensure that different shades are presented. In the end, such 
redescriptions hold the solution. But just as they stand, they do not tell us what is wrong with the 
original way of putting things: the shirt looks uniformly orange all over, yet the top part looks 
different in color from the bottom. In addition to providing a consistent redescription, a proper 
account should show how and why (if at all) the original description goes wrong. 
II
Any attempt to avoid inconsistency will consider the possibility that we have ambiguity or some 
similar phenomenon. In particular, it might be suggested that a familiar distinction between so-
called epistemic and phenomenal senses of “look” should be brought to bear on our puzzle. 
“Look” in its phenomenal sense is supposed to be used merely to report appearances, not things 
we infer from them, whereas “look” in its epistemic sense reports the result of an appearance-
based inference. A standard example of the latter is
6. The neighbors look to be away
which, if true, does not involve seeing the neighbors, and so cannot be regarded as a report of 
their visual appearances. Rather, I see other things (the overstuffed mailbox and empty garage), 
and these present appearances on the basis of which I infer the absence of neighbors.
It is fairly hard to find a clear candidate for an epistemic “look” which is followed simply by an 
adjective (like “orange”), or adjective phrase (like “uniformly orange”). In (6), “look” is 
followed by a verb in the infinitive. This might prompt the thought that in the following pair
47. The shirt looks uniformly orange
8. The shirt looks to be uniformly orange
(8) represents an epistemic rather than a phenomenal “look”. This would be offered as an 
interpretation of (1), (2) would be interpreted phenomenally, and our contradiction in appearance 
would disappear. The conflict would be of a common enough kind, between how things look and 
how we are inclined to judge them to be.
This easy solution does not work. First, it is clear that “looks” plus infinitive can be used to make 
phenomenal as opposed to epistemic reports. Seeing a Müller-Lyer puzzle, it seems quite proper 
to say that the lines look to be different in length, even if one has not the slightest disposition to 
believe that they are different in length. Second, it is clear that both (7) and (8) can properly be 
used to make purely phenomenal reports. The aim in both cases may properly be simply to 
describe the visual appearances, and not to say what one has inferred. Similar points hold for 
associated constructions, for example “looks like” and “looks as if”. Even when an epistemic 
interpretation has been set aside, we can still generate an apparent inconsistency with 
phenomenal readings.
The different appearance of, on the one hand, a two-colored shirt and, on the other, a uniformly 
colored shirt differentially illuminated is fairly hard to describe in words, and considerable 
painterly skill is required to represent it on canvas. (Leonardo da Vinci said: “light and shade 
should blend without lines or borders, in the manner of smoke” (Notebooks §492). Adelson 
(1995) says that the relatively gentle luminosity gradient generated by shadows is an important 
cue.) The difference, however exactly it is cued, is quite apparent: it is a difference in 
appearances, and is clearly phenomenally available. We can normally easily tell just by looking 
which case we are dealing with. In my envisaged situation, the shirt looks uniformly orange, and 
looks to be uniformly orange, and looks as if it is uniformly orange, and looks very different 
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senses of “looks” to undermine our determination to affirm (1), understood as a phenomenal 
report. 
We would have a flat contradiction in appearances if the following was true:
9. The shirt looks (to be) non-uniform orange.
But this seems not to be so, especially if the parentheses are deleted. (9) looks made for reporting 
the case in which the shirt looks multi-colored, and that is not how the shirt looks. Bearing this in 
mind, we need to reexamine (2) itself:
The upper and lower parts of the shirt look different in color.
We need to understand how the parts of the shirt could look that way, without the shirt looking 
non-uniform. The explanation seems to be this: sometimes colors appear as colors of surfaces, 
and sometimes they do not. When they appear as colors of surfaces, the surfaces appear to be 
colored. But when colors appear as, for example, colored lights, the appearance is not as of a 
colored surface. I suggest that the explanation of the consistency in the appearances reported by 
(1) and (2) is that (2) need not be understood as reporting a difference of apparent surface color, 
as opposed to a difference in apparent color; whereas it is very difficult to understand (1) except 
as reporting on an apparent surface color.
The upper and lower parts of the shirt look different in color, but do not look to be of different 
colors. They present different colors, but do not present surfaces as differing in color. The 
inconsistency in appearance is revealed as illusory. But this is not the end of the story, for the 
proposed interpretation of (2) does not show it to be false; on the contrary, the interpretation 
explains what makes (2) true. So if the veridicality principles (V1) and (V2) are correct, we still 
have an inconsistency, one that cannot be ignored, for it is an inconsistency in fact: the 
inconsistency of (4) and (5).
1 The infinitive is needed whenever something non-adjectival follows “looks”: “looks to be a 
car”, “looks to be dancing”. Adjectives can feature as complements to forms of the verb “to 
be” (“is orange”), and can also be attached directly to nouns (“orange shirt”); this may explain 
why they can either directly follow “look” or else be part of the infinitive construction.
6III
With the distinction between surface colors and others in hand, we are going to need more than 
one principle of veridicality: at a minimum, one which says that surface looks are veridical just 
when a surface has the apparent color in question, and another which says that the appearance of 
a color is veridical just when that color is present, not necessarily as a surface color.
A surface color is simply the color possessed by some surface. For color-sighted people, seeing a 
colored object in suitable circumstances gives rise to an appearance which is not only the 
appearance of a surface color, but an appearance which is distinctive of surface colors. Typically, 
the appearance to which a surface color gives rise is manifestly different from the appearance to 
which a non-surface color gives rise: when we see colored light, or see the sky, or see water 
underwater, or water from above at night when it is illuminated from below, or a work of James 
Turrell, it does not look as if we are seeing a colored surface. In seeing something whose surface 
is red, one typically sees the color red, and also sees the surface as red (it looks red). But one 
may see a color without seeing anything looking like a surface of that color: looking at the sky 
on a clear day, it looks blue, but it does not look as if the sky, or anything else, has a blue surface. 
Awareness of a color as a color of a surface guarantees awareness of that color, but the converse 
does not hold.
When we think about the color-appearances of colored objects, we naturally think about surface 
color. This is what underlies (V1) (If an object, x, looks F, this experience is veridical iff x is F). 
Typically when we ascribe a color to an object with colored surfaces, we think of our ascription 
as true iff a surface has the color we ascribe. It was in the nature of our example that this did not 
lead to trouble with the claim that the shirt looked uniformly orange. We took the reported 
experience to be an experience in which surface color is manifest. Veridicality was accordingly 
assumed to consist in the manifest surface color being the color of the shirt’s surface. For some 
kinds of colors with which we are presented, including those presented as non-surface colors, 
this account of veridicality will be inappropriate. This includes the case in which the shirt 
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possessed by any surface. That is how things are with the apparently lighter upper part of the 
shirt and the apparently darker lower part.
The point can be made in more detail by moving away from English to an extension of English 
which has no word “looks” but a number of word-forms on the pattern “X-looks”. Here are three 
of these unfamiliar words, with approximate English equivalents alongside. “F” is to be replaced 
by a word for a color or shade of color.
x S-looks F x looks as if it has an F surface
x V-looks F x looks like a volume suffused with color F
x P-looks F x presents a color that looks F, though x neither S-looks F nor V-looks F
The table is not supposed to be complete. For example, the “V-looks” category may need 
subdivision, to deal with the different looks of dyed water and water illuminated by colored light; 
and further main categories may need to be added.
The sky V-looks blue, but does not S-look blue (no surface is visible). A ripe tomato typically S-
looks red, even when nothing V-looks red. If we merely shine a magenta light on a piece of white 
card, the card continues to S-look white, even though it also P-looks magenta. Unless we take a 
lot of care, the result of our illumination is just to make the card look to be a white card with 
magenta light shining on it. (With care, we can make the card S-look magenta.) This example 
would tend to generate an apparent inconsistency in appearance when described in ordinary 
English, for we might incline to say that the card with the magenta light shining on it looked 
white (all over) and also looked magenta (all over); these colors are exclusive. The veridicality 
conditions for S-looking and V-looking are clearly distinct, so something (e.g. the sky) can V-
look F without S-looking F (or anything else). One might at first think that P-looking cannot fail 
to be veridical, but there is no guarantee of this. For all I know, if one suffers from jaundice, 
white things present a pale yellow appearance without S-looking yellow . (This may not be how 
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yellow P-look is non-veridical. 
The envisaged X-look language enables us to describe some familiar features of appearance that 
are hard to describe in English. When we put on sunglasses things in a sense look darker but (as 
we might put it) do not look as if they are darker, a case which generates the original puzzle. The 
contrast is not merely that between phenomenal and epistemic looks. As I put on the sunglasses I 
have no tendency to judge that any object becomes darker. In addition, there is a clear sense in 
which the objects do not look darker. In X-language the threatened inconsistency in appearance 
is avoided: objects S-look the same before and after putting on the glasses, but they do not P-
look the same.
P-looking is so defined as to exclude S-looking and V-looking. But is there not a more general 
notion, call it P*-looking, which includes the other kinds of looking, and which is the basic form 
of a mind’s experiential confrontation with a color? We might think of it as a color being 
presented, but without specification of whether it is presented as a surface color, a volume color, 
or whatever. For every X, if something X-looks F, it P*-looks F. Then we seem to be saddled 
with contradiction in appearance, for it seems we must say both that the shirt P*-looks uniform 
in color and also P*-looks non-uniform. 
I think it is wrong to say that such a general notion of looking has any part to play in describing 
our visual experiences, at least where colors are concerned. When the shirt looks uniform orange, 
it is not that a uniform orange color is presented. S-looking does not guarantee P*-looking, if 
“P*” connects in any natural way with the ordinary notion of presentation. What may have been 
overlooked is that there is a purely phenomenal notion of S-looking which does not always 
amount to the presentation of a color. It is not that we infer that the shirt is uniform orange: that 
is how it looks. Yet there is no presentation of a uniform orange color which extends across the 
shirt. That is just how things are with how things look; and we should welcome it, for this is 
what ensures that there is not really a contradiction in appearance.
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x veridically S-looks F x has an F surface
x veridically V-looks F x is a volume suffused with color F
x veridically P-looks F x presents color F
It is also obvious how to extend these to comparative cases.2
The orange shirt veridically S-looks a single shade of orange all over, and veridically P-looks 
different shades. So the shirt has a surface which is a single shade all over, but presents different 
shades. What else could one expect from different levels of illumination?
IV
One might attempt to resolve the puzzle in other ways. I will mention two such alternatives.
(A) “Darker than” is unspecific or ambiguous between darker in color than, call this darkerc, and 
less brightly illuminated than, call this darkeri. The lower part of the shirt looks darkeri than the 
upper part, but does not look darkerc. So it does not look darker in color than the upper part, and 
so does not look different in color from the upper part; only differently illuminated. One problem 
with the proposal arises from the close semantic connection between the comparative and non-
comparative forms: both or neither should display ambiguity or underspecification. Hence the 
present proposal entails that “dark” in, for example, “dark orange”, can properly interpreted as 
meaning “less brightly illuminated orange”. This result is incorrect: dark orange is a color, not 
some kind of pairing of a color and an illumination level. The proposal is also lacking in 
generality. Lacking the resources of the X-looks language, we can create similar puzzles that do 
not depend on “darker” or “dark”. The swimming pool (or the water in it) illuminated by a pink 
underwater light at night veridically looks pink, but it is not pink; hence we must find an 
alternative account of veridical looking in this case. Likewise the sky veridically looks blue, even 
2 There are other normative dimensions of assessment of appearances, for example, something 
may look just as it should (to a creature with such-and-such a perceptual system in such-and-
such circumstances).
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though it has no blue surface (and so counts as “not blue”, as this phrase is most often used), and 
an apple may veridically look red even though it has no volume suffused with red.
(B) Color words are semantically underspecific or ambiguous or polysemous: “x is orange” may 
be true just if x has an orange surface, or just if x is a volume suffused with orange, or just if x is 
an orange light. We don’t need different ways of looking, only different ways in which colors can 
find a place in the world. For example, instead of “x S-looks F” we should say “x looks FS”, 
where “F” is to be replaced by a color adjective, and the subscript shows that it is to taken as 
ascribing a surface color. Instead of “x V-looks F” we should say “x looks FV”; and so on. There 
is one way of looking, but many ways color can relate to objects.
The idea has some appeal. For one thing there are certainly many ways for colors to exist, not 
just as surface colors. And there is independent evidence for the relevant behavior of color 
adjectives.3 But the proposal seems not to do justice to all the cases, including the original one: 
“orange” is used just once in (1) and (2), so supposing the word to be polysemous does not 
immediately explain the phenomenon. Another conspicuously hard case for this approach is the 
change in look produced by putting on sunglasses. We can describe the effect without using any 
specific color words (“Everything looks darker, though nothing looks to have changed color”), so 
polysemous color words don’t seem to be able to begin to address the case.
V
When we speak the X-looks language, there is no inconsistency, within or outside of 
appearances, as we saw in §III above. Nothing follows about how things are when we speak 
English. A simple conjecture extends the happy result for the X-look language to English: 
English “looks” is ambiguous between, or unspecific between, or polysemous between, the 
meanings of the various X-looks expressions. The upshot is (i) that we have inconsistency in 
appearance only when there is inconsistency in the content of “looks” sentences which have been 
rendered unambiguous or specific in the same way and (ii) that there is no single veridicality 
3 There are well-known cases in which surface and interior colors are contrasted, as in Travis (1997) and 
Bezuidenhout (2002).
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condition for English “looks” sentences. In the original account of how the shirt looked, the two 
occurrences of “looks” (in (1) and (2)) need to have different disambiguations or specifications if 
they are both to be true; each corresponds to a different veridicality condition. As a result, there 
is no inconsistency in appearance, and, afortiori, no inconsistency in fact. A further conclusion is 
that all arguments (and there are many) which trade on a single veridicality condition for “looks” 
need to be reconsidered.4
REFERENCES
Adelson, Edward H (1995). http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/
checkershadow_illusion.html
Bezuidenhout, A. (2002). "Truth conditional pragmatics." Philosophical Perspectives 16: 105–
34.
Travis, C. (1997). “Pragmatics.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, B. Hale and C. 
Wright (eds), Oxford, Blackwell Publishers: 87–107.
da Vinci, Leonardo, Notebooks. Various editions and translations, for example: http://
www.gutenberg.org/etext/5000
4 Many thanks to Mike Martin and Michael Tye for valuable comments.
